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1. Introduction 
There has been a long-standing debate among economists on the relative efficiency 
of price and quantity regulation instruments to correct market failures such as externalities 
(e.g., Weitzman, 1974 and Kaplow and Shavell, 2002 on pollution control in environmental 
economics). We focus on this topic in a spatial economy and compare the efficiency of tax 
instruments (property taxes and congestion charges) and zoning (floor area ratio regulations 
and land-use type regulations) as policy instruments to control the simultaneous congestion of 
road and nonroad infrastructure. 
This topic is important especially in city planning, simply because land use 
regulations (LURs) are indispensable in city planning. Consequently, it is natural that urban 
economists have been discussing the efficiency and equivalence of the LURs and Pigouvian 
tolls as instruments to mitigate congestion for several decades
1
.  
Research on the efficiency of LURs, henceforth also zoning, has been showing a 
wide variety of results depending on the specific framework used. In case of the monocentric 
city, it is well established that road congestion can be reduced by raising density. One form of 
this proposition states that in the monocentric city, lot-size zoning is equivalent to congestion 
charge in its effect on efficiency (Pines and Sadka, 1985; Wheaton 1998). However, this 
holds only in the case of fixed travel demand, in which case the lot-size zoning can modify 
the spatial distribution of travelers in the exactly same way as the congestion tolls (Oron et al., 
1973; Wheaton, 1998). A slight generalized setting, however, immediately invalidates this 
proposition. Indeed, the lot-size zoning is second-best (Pines and Sadka, 1985; Kono et al., 
2012) or even third-best (Pines and Kono, 2012). If agglomeration economies are present in 
addition to road congestion, land-use type zoning can almost be first-best if linked with a 
subsidy to internalize agglomeration economies in the polycentric framework (Rhee et al., 
                                           
1 Besides, there is a sizable body of planning literature. There, the “efficiency” of development controls is not 
something to be disputed, and the controls are required to “grow smart” (Ewing et al., 2007). 
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2014). In contrast, the urban growth boundary (UGB), which is in principle second-best in 
analytical models (Kanemoto, 1977; Arnott, 1979; Pines and Sadka, 1985), are found to 
improve welfare negligibly (Brueckner, 2007) or even be absolutely harmful in the 
polycentric framework (Anas and Rhee, 2006). In some cases, an expansionary growth 
boundary is recommended instead (Anas and Rhee, 2007; Anas and Pines, 2008). The third 
type of land use regulation usually considered is floor area ratio (FAR) regulation. FAR 
regulation is found to be an effective substitute of the first-best congestion toll when a 
minimum FAR is applied at the city center and maximum FARs are applied in the suburb in 
the closed monocentric city framework (Kono et al., 2012); the efficiency requires maximum 
FARs everywhere in the open monocentric city framework (Kono and Joshi, 2012)
2
.  
There is much less literature on mitigating nonroad congestion in the theoretical 
spatial models. Since each new resident entails additional costs of public service provision, 
the (Pigouvian) property tax is an efficient congestion charge that is indispensable when non-
distortionary head tax is unavailable (Hoyt, 1991; Krelove, 1993). Since zoning forces 
residents to consume “at least some minimum amount of housing” (Hamilton, 1975: 206) and, 
thus, is able to control density, the zoning works in a similar fashion to pricing instruments. 
In the monocentric city with negative agglomeration externalities, optimal zoning consists of 
a maximum FAR in the center where nonroad congestion is assumed to be stronger and 
minimum FARs in the suburb (Kono et al., 2009). 
Until now, land use regulations have been studied only on each single type of 
congestion, either road or nonroad congestion, but not both. However, congestion of nonroad 
infrastructure such as fire protection, police services, health care, schools, sewerages, energy, 
and telecommunication infrastructure or waste management, is usually present together with 
road congestion. Tackling these two types of externalities requires employing at least two 
types of LURs that do not fully correlate. As this has not been studied so far, it is not obvious 
a priori whether there is an efficient mix of LURs or whether the LURs are equivalent to 
optimal pricing instruments. The first candidate from the pricing instruments is Pigouvian 
congestion charging and the property taxation on the differential land rent arising from 
congested nonroad infrastructure. This is supposed to imply self-financing of nonroads 
according to the Henry George theorem (Flatters et al., 1974; Stiglitz, 1977; Arnott and 
                                           
2 Optimal regulation may also depend on other existing non-optimal policies. For instance, if FAR regulation is 
linked with non-Pigouvian cordon tolls this implies a minimum FAR inside and maximum FARs outside the 
cordon ring in the monocentric city (Kono and Kawaguchi, 2015). 
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Stiglitz, 1979). Despite the intuition, it has not yet been studied as to whether this instrument 
mix is efficient in the presence of the two types of congestion. Because of the interaction 
between these two types of congestion, it may also happen that the optimal levels of the tax 
instruments deviate from pure Pigouvian levels (see Parry and Bento, 2002, on the interaction 
of externalities). In this case, the self-financing rule could not be sustained. 
The first purpose of this study is to compare the efficiencies of pricing and regulatory 
instruments when both types of congestion coexist. To be able to study land-use type 
regulation, we need a mixed land use of residences and production. Therefore, we apply 
Anas-Xu (1999) type model that allows us to study these issues in a general equilibrium 
spatial model
3
. Our model includes features that are closely related to the real world 
including a general equilibrium non-monocentric model, two types of congestion, a basket of 
different regulation instruments, mixed land use for production and residences, and household 
heterogeneity. The household heterogeneity is a standard feature of the real world although it 
is neglected in most of the references above (exceptions are Anas and Rhee, 2006 and Rhee et 
al., 2014). In this case, marginal utilities of income (MUIs) may differ and the standard 
Pigouvian pricing is no longer first-best unless a special analytical remedy is administered, 
such as income transfers among households to equalize MUIs (De Palma and Lindsey, 2004). 
We derive the first-order formulas of the welfare change associated with various 
instruments (taxes and LURs). The formulas reveal the essential differences between the 
model with and without household heterogeneity, between taxes and LURs, and between the 
spatial and non-spatial models. We, then, perform numerical simulations to compare the 
efficiencies. The major findings are follows.  
First, we show that the free market fails to achieve the first-best efficiency in the 
spatial model with household heterogeneity even in the absence of market failures such as 
externalities. Although this result is in principle known and stems from differences in 
marginal utilities of income (MUIs) across heterogeneous households, the new finding is that 
income redistribution to equalize MUIs does not restore the first-best efficiency in the spatial 
model. The redistribution itself introduces a spatial distortion that nullifies the effectiveness 
of the conventional first-best instrument mix. The same proposition holds in the spatial 
economy with traffic congestion as well; Pigouvian pricing plus redistribution equalizing the 
                                           
3 As a side issue our model is able to reproduce the results from the literature mentioned above and show how 
different assumptions or even the limited model setup applied in those studies determine these results.  
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MUIs is not efficient with household heterogeneity. We can generalize this finding, that is, 
the standard prescription of De Palma and Lindsey (2004) holds only when the household 
heterogeneity is fixed, but fails if households are able to change their household type 
endogenously. Thus, our finding may hold in other cases too, where households change their 
own types by marrying, becoming parents, and switching travel modes, routes, house types, 
ownership types, income, or skill groups. In such cases, it turns out that only numerical 
simulations or empirical testing can tell which policy mix is welfare maximizing. 
Second, we analytically decompose welfare changes completely and numerically 
approximate the changes by component for the first time. A byproduct of this exercise is the 
covariance term of the Feldstein (1972) type representing the impact of heterogeneity on 
welfare in the spatial framework. Indeed, they account for a significant proportion of the total 
welfare change. This makes it clear that neglecting the covariance term in the presence of 
household heterogeneity may induce misperceptions of other components of the effects. This 
result may carry over to other issues of household heterogeneity, too. In addition, referring to 
the welfare decomposition, we explain some puzzles raised in the literature of urban and 
transportation economics. 
Third, the precise decomposition of the welfare change shows the different channels 
through which taxes and LURs affect welfare in the spatial economy with congestion
4
. While 
Pigouvian taxes internalize congestion externalities in the standard way, LURs have 
additional terms showing real estate market distortions and compliance costs of LURs. In the 
numerical analysis, these costs turn out to be huge and rise rapidly as the regulations get 
tighter.  
Fourth, concerning the equivalence of LURs and Pigouvian pricing, numerical 
simulations confirm that LURs can indeed be as efficient as Pigouvian taxation in the second 
best way. This, however, is true only for a narrow range of city size, while LURs are clearly 
less efficient than the second-best Pigouvian charging for larger cities where infrastructure is 
highly congested. This is not known in the exiting literature, which claims or implicitly 
accepts the proposition that zoning is almost as efficient as Pigouvian tolling. In addition, we 
find that in the case of smaller cities, LURs can be even more efficient than Pigouvian pricing, 
a result not yet reported in the literature. 
The first purpose of the study as stated above is about the efficiency of optimal 
                                           
4 Bertaud and Brueckner (2005) study costs of LUR in a monocentric model without externalities. 
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policies. An implicit assumption there is that the optimal policies are known to the planner. In 
contrast, the second purpose of this paper concerns the instrument choice, which is widely 
studied in environmental economics, when the planner cannot set the policies optimally. 
There are several reasons why actual policies deviate from the optimum such as conflicting 
aims of regulators (planners, tax authorities, or decision makers), imperfect internal decision-
making and planning processes, or imperfect regulatory information (missing, wrong or 
uncertain). To be more specific, actual land use regulations are chosen according to the 
objectives that are often conflicting with one another. Compact development is an example 
where saving in peri-urban areas could worsen outdoor living quality in inner cities 
(Westerink, 2013). To our knowledge, this problem has not been studied yet in the spatial 
framework.  
However, unlike the existing instrument choice literature, we introduce imprecision 
into the policies themselves rather than into the costs and benefits of pollution abatement. 
This analytical twist is so useful that we can evaluate any type of discrete policy deviation 
from optimal policies; the uncertainties of the costs and benefits of pollution abatement are a 
special case of our approach. In this new framework, we provide a formula, showing the 
welfare gain or loss at any point along the equilibrium path away from the optimum. Unlike 
the Weitzman’s (1974) famous formula “       ” that holds only near the optimum, our 
formula in general justifies the possible superiority of externality pricing to quantity 
regulation for discrete deviation whatever the reason. As Pizer (1997) shows numerically, 
when the policy change is discrete, Weitzman’s formula easily loses its predictive power. We 
confirm our theory by showing that indeed the welfare cost of deviation is so large for zoning 
failures that it is not only efficient but also safe to use tax instruments rather than the LURs. 
Ironically, the welfare costs arise even when policies are optimally set on average. Moreover, 
we find that imprecise LURs can even be worse than doing nothing at all as a means to curb 
congestion.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical model. 
Two types of infrastructure externalities are modeled: road and nonroad congestions. We 
characterize the first-best and second-best instruments in Section 3 and 4, respectively; we 
also discuss the optimal adjustment of land uses. In Section 5, we conduct numerical 
simulations and in Section 6 explore the consequences of deviations from optimal policies 
including Monte Carlo experiments. Section 7 concludes. Additionally, a glossary appears at 
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the end of the paper.  
2. The Model 
A closed metropolitan area is composed of an arbitrary number of zones. The lots 
inside a zone are treated identically for the purpose of residence, production, and travel. We 
measure distance by the distance between zone centroids. Thus, we abstract from intrazonal 
distance issues. Households choose where to live and work; firms choose the location of 
operations. Cross commuting occurs because residences and jobs are intermingled over the 
metropolitan area. For simplicity, we assume no trade of composite goods between zones, 
because the trade introduces no real difference to our analysis. 
2.1. Builders and composite good producers 
Builders in zone i construct office buildings using land 
B
iQ  and capital 
B
iX  
according to a constant returns to scale technology ( , )
B B
i i i iB B Q X . The output iB  is a 
proxy for the structure services that users of a building enjoy and are measured by the office 
building’s floor area. A builder has a lot in which the maximum FAR allowed is 
B
if , which 
means 
B
i
B
i iB f Q . In other words, imposing a maximum FAR in a zone means that the 
planner intends to lower the zone’s market FAR below this maximum level. Let the unit land 
and capital rents be ,
X
i ir p , respectively. The Lagrangian of the cost minimization problem 
facing office builders in zone i  is 
   ( , ) Bi iB X B B B B B BB i i i i i i i ii i iB B Q X B f QrQ p X       ,  (1) 
where 0
B
i   is the marginal cost of iB  when the FAR regulation is not binding, and 
0Bi   is the marginal compliance cost of the FAR regulation in zone i . When 
B
if  is set 
sufficiently high, the FAR regulation is not binding and the problem reverts to the standard 
cost minimization problem. Similarly, the planner may set the minimum FAR 
B
if , which 
requires B
i
B
i ifB Q . 
There is a second type of builder, who is known as a housing builder. Denote the 
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total floor area of housing in zone i by iH . Similar to the office builders, the housing 
builders use land HiQ  and capital 
H
iX  to produce housing iH , and the technology obeys 
constant returns to scale. We denote the unit rental price of housing traded in zone i  by Hip  
and measure housing services by the floor area. 
 Firms produce composite good iX  using building services iB  
and labor iM . 
( , )X Xi i i i i iX S x B M S x , where ( , )i ix B M  is homogenous of degree one in inputs and 
X
iS  is a 
multiplier, external to each firm, showing the service quality of nonroad infrastructure in zone
i . We set the service level as ( , , )X Xi i i iS S B H K , where / 0
X
i iS B   , / 0
X
i iS H    
(congestible) and / 0Xi iS K   , 
where iK  is capacity of nonroad infrastructure which is 
under the planner’s control. For simplicity, we assume that both firms and households use the 
same nonroad infrastructure. When land use is mixed, this approximation is not a wholly 
unrealistic assumption. Road congestion is an important class of infrastructure congestion, 
but we deal with road congestion through commuters’ congested travel. Compared with 
smaller buildings, larger buildings are correlated with more output level, so they consume 
more services provided by local infrastructure and produce more network congestion from 
business trips and trade. The maximum FAR regulations, motivated partly by these planning 
concerns, target the proxy variables for their control in practice. 
 The city collects taxes for financing congestible infrastructure. Specifically, the X-
good firm’s profit maximization problem is 
, ,
max (1 )
i i i
B B
i i i i i
X
i i
X B M
p B w Mp X    ,    (2) 
where 
B
i  is the tax rate, and price terms are defined in an obvious way. In this way, we 
assume that one unit of the X-good is converted to one unit of capital input 
B
iX  
in (1) for 
building construction. 
 At firms optimum we can derive a useful differential equation. 
((1 ) )
X X
X B B X i i
i i i i i i i i i i i
B B
i i
i
i
i
S S
X dp p B d B dp M dw p x dB dK
B K
 
  
    
 
 

  (3) 
In the absence of tax and infrastructure congestion, 0
B X
i idS   , so that we have 
X B
i i i i i iX dp B dp M dw  , a familiar general equilibrium equation relating inputs, output, and 
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their prices to one another. 
 
2.2. Households 
By household      , we mean the representative household living in zone   and 
working in zone  . We differentiate types of households by commuting arrangements      . 
For a given residence–work zone pair ( , )i j , the utility maximization problem of household 
      is 
, ,
max ( , , , )
ij ij ij
H
ij ij ij i
z h l
iju z h l S  ,        (4) 
subject to (1 (8) )
X H
i ij i ij j
H
i ij ij ijp z p h w t d D     , (8 )ij ij ijT g d l   ,   
where 
     1 H H B B Xij i i i i i i i i i i i i
i
i i ij ij ijij
ii
r A y P y
N
D t F p H p B rR p K 
 
   
 
       ,  (5) 
land rent         taxes returned          infrastructure costs   net income transfer 
( , , )H Hi i i iS S H B K . 
ijz  denotes the composite good X  consumed by household      , 
H
ip  is the unit rental 
price of housing in the residence zone   , and ijh  is the amount of household      ’s 
consumption of housing measured by floor area. The subscripts of the other variables are 
interpreted in the same way. The tax rate 
H
i  is charged on housing consumption. ijt  are the 
traffic congestion charges collected from households commuting between zone   and  .
(.)HiS  
is the service level of local infrastructure as rated by households and is a function of a 
zone’s floor areas (housing and office buildings) as well as the capacity of nonroad 
infrastructure in that zone. Household       commutes ijd  days a month and work eight 
hours a day, while being paid jw  dollars an hour at work zone  . Each household is 
endowed with T  hours a month, which it allocates for commuting ij ijg d , leisure ijl , and 
working 8 ijd . ijg  is the daily commuting time between the two zones      . 
Households own equal shares of the entire land in the metropolitan area, and the land 
rent collected is distributed equally. The metropolitan government collects taxes, uses them 
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for financing infrastructure, and returns what remains to households. it  is the traffic 
congestion toll for cars on zone i ’s roads; iF  is zone i ’s traffic volume. Nonlabor income 
ijD  shows the fiscal arrangement to be analyzed. The planner uses the lump-sum instrument 
ijy  to equalize the MUIs of heterogeneous households in the potential first-best regime. If 
there is a budget deficit, the head tax is collected. ijP , which we explain in the next paragraph, 
is the share of household type ( , )i j  among the fixed total population N . 
 The random utility term 
ij
 is an i.i.d. Gumbel variate with mean zero and 
dispersion parameter  . The probability that a household most prefers zone   and   as its 
home–work zone pair is given by /ex expp ij mni mnjP V V   , where ijV  is the indirect 
utility of household      . We measure the welfare W  of residents by the expected value of 
the maximized utilities of the households in this metropolitan area (McFadden, 1974; Small 
and Rosen, 1981; Anas and Rhee, 2006): 
1) ln ex pma ( xij ij
ij
ij ijW E V V 
      .   (6) 
Households in our model are heterogeneous because they are differentiated by their 
tastes for the matched pair of home-work zones. The social welfare function is a nonlinear 
sum of individual utilities. Residential sorting by heterogeneous households is widely 
observed in metropolitan areas, and the social welfare function (4) is one way of 
incorporating this heterogeneity. Because households differ inherently in tastes, any policy 
necessarily has distinct differential impacts on each type of household, and the social planner 
weighs the impacts using the welfare function of the heterogeneous households’ differentiated 
evaluations. 
2.3. Market equilibrium conditions 
The left-hand sides of the following market clearing conditions represent demand and the 
right-hand sides show corresponding supply. 
Building markets, Housing: ij ij ij NP h H     (7) 
Office: input demand of X-good firms = iB   (8) 
10 
 
X-goods markets: B H
ij ij i i i ij
NP z X X K X        (9) 
Labor markets: (8 )i ji jijM NP d      (10) 
Land markets: 
H B
i i i iQ Q R A        (11) 
Further equilibrium conditions are: 
 Three types of zero profits, Housing and office builders and X-good firms (12) 
In (11), we set road capacity iR  equal to the land area allocated to roads while zonal land 
areas are fixed at iA . 
 All eight equalities exist in each zone  ; the unknowns are five prices in each zone, 
, , , , X H Bi i i i ir p p p w , and three outputs, , , i i iH B X , in each zone. We do not list the capital inputs, 
, XH Bi iX , of the housing and office builders as unknowns. Once the outputs , i iB X  are known, 
the capital inputs are given by the input demand in the relevant markets. Because we have the 
same number of equations and unknowns, we should be able to solve for all the unknowns. 
We can express all variables of the system as functions of these eight unknowns and policy 
variables in each zone. 
3. The Potential First-Best Regime 
3.1. Theory: the first-order rate of welfare change 
The planner maximizes welfare ( )W   with respect to Pigouvian charges, infrastructural 
capacities  
#
1
,, , ,
zones
H B
i i i ii i
t R K 

, and income redistribution         : 
#
1max ({ , , , } ,{ } ),
H B zones
i i i i i iji ijR K yW t      
subject to the market equilibrium conditions and the public budget constraint. 
A familiar approach is to form a Lagrangian with all the important constraints, including the 
market equilibrium conditions, combined by multipliers. However, this does not work 
because of the sheer complexity of the problem. Instead, we differentiate W  with respect to 
a policy variable and later incorporate the equilibrium conditions. 
 Because the equation system (7)–(12) is composed of eight types of unknowns 
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specified above, we can write the first-order derivative with respect to a fiscal instrument
    
#
1
, , ,
zones
H B
k k k ij ijk
t y  

  as follows: 
1,2 1,2
1,2 1,2 1,2
(.)
.
X H B
ij ij j ij ijn n n
ij ij ij ijX H B
ij n ij ij n ij nn j n n
ij ij ij ijn n n
ij ij ij ij
ij n ij n ij n ijn n n
V V dw V Vdp dp dpdW
P P P P
d p w p p
V V
d d
V Vdr dH dB
P P P P
r H d
d d
d B d
    
   
 
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
      
      
   (13) 
We can derive, say, 
X
ij iV p   (a derivative of indirect utility in the price of the X-good 
produced and sold in zone i ) in the first term by applying the envelope theorem to the utility 
maximization problem.
5
. The result is 
X M
ij i ij ijV p c z    . This term contains household 
( , )i j ’s MUI, 
M
ijc . n  runs from 1 to 2, which means there are two zones in the city. This is 
arbitrary, and the formula holds for the city with an arbitrary finite number of zones. 
 On the other hand, (13) has price and quantity derivatives such as 
X
idp d , jdw d , 
ndH d . The differential equation (3) links these terms. Using the market equilibrium 
conditions (7)–(12), we can simplify (13) to the following intuitive form (Appendix 1): 
       (a)              (b) 
MEC from more , ( ) MEC from more , ( )i iB H
X H X H
X Xi i i i i i
i i i i i iM
i ii
B B H H
i
i
i
i i
i i i ip p
d
S S dB S S dHN dW
p x N p x N
c d B B H dH
   
  
    
      
         
      
   
   
   
 
1,2
iji
ii ijii i j
i
w F g
d
dPdF
t Ny
d 
 
   
 
    + Cov.      (14) 
         (c)                (d)      (e) 
The welfare change is composed of five elements: (a) the Pigouvian term for marginal 
congestion costs of office services, (b) the Pigouvian term for marginal congestion costs of 
housing services, (c) the Pigouvian term for marginal road congestion, (d) the distortion term 
of spatial allocation, and (e) the covariance term due to heterogeneity of households. This is 
                                           
5 The standard approach is to apply Roy’s identity, which is rather inconvenient in our general equilibrium 
setup. 
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the basic formula whose components we discuss below. 
Symbols in (14) are defined as follows: M M
ij ijij
c P c  is the average MUI, iN  is 
the number of zone i ’s residents,  ,ii ig Fg R  is the travel cost in zone i, 
 H Mij iij iju S c   , and  ii ijj ijNP N   (zone i  households’ average marginal 
utility of nonroad infrastructure service HiS  in monetary terms). The traffic in zone  , iF , is 
iF   within-zone trips + passing-through trips + incoming trips + outgoing trips 
,
( )
n m i
ii nm mn n
n
i in
i n i
F F F F F , 
where ijF  is the traffic volume from zone   to zone  . Cov is defined as follows: 
Cov  
Expected value of ij
M M
ij ij ij ij ijij
ij
A
M
P c c A A
N
c
P
 
 
 
 
 
 
   ,   (15) 
where 
(1)
,
( )( )8
X H
j iji i
ij ij ij ij
H H
i i i i
ij
i
H
ij ij
ij
ij ij k
i
dw dgdp dp
A z d d
d d d d
S dH S dB
d
h w
H d B d

  
   
 
   
 








  (16) 
with 1ijk   
when the origin–destination zone pair       contains zone k , and zero 
otherwise. When the policy instrument is ijy , 
ij
ks  is added to (14), where 0 
ks
ij  for 
   , ,i j k s , and zero otherwise. ijA  is the change in consumer surplus due to the effects of 
changes in prices and externalities on household type       induced by fiscal instrument  . 
The first term in (14) shows the consumer surplus change in zone i ’s X-good market 
triggered by the price change in the X-good price, 
X
ip . ijw  is household      ’s value of 
time. Because ijA  distributes with population probabilities  ijP , and the two multiplied 
terms in (15) are weighted by these probabilities, Cov is the covariance of individual MUIs 
M
ijc  and the rate of consumer surplus change ijA  that a policy change d  engenders. 
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When the policy instruments are infrastructure capacities, new terms are added to 
(14):   
X
k
H
X k k
k k k k
k k
S S
p x N r
R R

 
 
 
 for road capacity kR     (17) 
X H
X Xk k
k k k k k
k k
S S
p x N p
K K

 
 
 
 for nonroad capacity kK  .  (18) 
Infrastructure capacity is expanded until the marginal expansion costs (last term in (18)) are 
equal to the reduced marginal congestion cost (first two terms in (18)). The same applies to 
road infrastructure in (17). 
 
3.2. Discussion 
3.2.1. Heterogeneity and the covariance term 
Although some other studies using a spatial model present similar covariance terms 
(e.g., Hirte and Tscharaktschiew, 2013; Rhee et al., 2014), thus far, its consequences have not 
been fully explored. We can understand the role of heterogeneity using a simplified model. 
Suppose that there is only one good x  whose unit price is p . This p  is endogenous in our 
system, which is again a function of a policy variable  . Thus, expressing the indirect 
utilities as  ( )iv p   ( i  is the type of households), we can write the welfare function as 
  1 2( ) , ( ), , ( )nvW v p v   , while omitting all the other variables for the sake of intuition 
(refer to the Appendix for the more detailed derivation). Then,  
   
  
  
     
  
   
   
  
  
  
     
     
  
   
   
  
  
 
    
  
  
  
   
  
        
  
 
            (19) 
where M
i idW dv c  is called the social MUI of household type 1, ,i n  and    is the 
amount of good x consumed by type   household. The last equality follows from Roy’ 
identity. It reveals the link between the welfare change and the change in consumer surplus 
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measured by the area below the inverse demand function.  
If only the despot’s utility matters, the covariance term does not arise from (19) 
simply because there is no such thing as variation in the MUIs. Next, suppose that we 
measure the social welfare by the area below the market demand curve. This means that we 
measure welfare (both individual and social) by monetary units with a uniform social MUI 
1Mi idW d c c    . Then, (19) becomes  
    
  
   
  
        
 
         
 
  
This expression does not have the covariance term
6
.  
 Divide both sides of (19) by   and take its limit. Then, expand and rearrange the 
terms.  
( )M M Mi i i
i ii i
dW dW dp dW dp
c x c c x
d dv d dv df f f
,  (20) 
(a)                  (b) 
where Mc is the expected value of 
M M
i i ii
c Pc . When the function W  is given by (6), 
we obtain i idW d P  , the proportion of type   households. Then, (a) in (20) represents 
the terms (a)+(b)+(c) in (14).  
It remains to explain how the covariance formula in (14) might be derived from (b) 
in (20). Since i idW d P  , a simple algebra shows that the last term of (20) is nothing but 
the covariance.  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) .
M M M M M M
i i i i i i i
i i ii
M M
i i i
i
dW dp dp
c c x P c c x P c c
dv d d
dp
P c c x
d
x
f f
x
f
, 
The first equality holds for all real numbers  , because       
            
 
  
                                           
6 Arnott and Krauss (1998) analyze the marginal cost pricing in the presence of heterogeneous facility users, but 
there does not arise the covariance term. In fact, they measure the welfare by the area under the demand curve. 
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            . Finally, set                                  to 
have the covariance formula in (15).  
On the basis of the discussion, we can state the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: The covariance term could arise if both of the following two conditions are 
met. 
 Condition (a) The welfare function contains an array of indirect utilities 
of heterogeneous households. 
 Condition (b) The social marginal utilities of income (social MUIs) differ between 
households. 
Remark We should be careful about the precise meaning of this proposition. Let     be the 
income of household      . From (6),            , so that household      ’s social MUI 
is                            
 . When the social MUIs differ (i.e., there are some pairs 
            such that       
        
 ),    
     is not guaranteed, so        
        
and the covariance term does not necessarily vanish. This is why we added a qualifier “could” 
in the first line of the proposition. At the same time, however, social MUIs all equal does not 
necessarily imply zero covariance (i.e., Cov=0) as well, because       
        
  for 
different             pairs does not necessarily imply    
     
 , in which case    
     
  
  with Cov=0. ■ 
 
3.2.2. Heterogeneity and the breakdown of the conventional first-best instruments  
First, we show that household heterogeneity itself is a source of market failure even 
in the absence of infrastructure congestion. Subsequently, we introduce congestion and 
further show that the set of first-best instruments known in the literature fails to make the 
whole terms in (14)-(16) vanish. Now, suppose that the infrastructure is free of congestion, 
and income redistribution ijy  is not yet a policy variable. No congestion means a constant 
service quality of infrastructure, 
X X H H
i i i i i i i iS B S H S B S H           0 , 0ig  at 
each zone  . Then, (14) reduces to 
B B H H
i
i i i
i
i
i
i
iM
i
ip p
d d d
dB dH dFN dW
t
c d
 
   
     + Cov.   (21) 
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If there were no covariance term, an efficient solution is achieved at 0B Hi i it     for all 
i  in (21) (recall that infrastructure is financed by head tax). However, since there is a 
covariance term in (21), 0B Hi i it     for all   does not necessarily imply 0dW d  . 
This demonstrates that the heterogeneity itself is a source of market failure. Markets do not 
deal with household heterogeneity in an efficient way even in the absence of any other market 
failures. 
Therefore, the presence of heterogeneous households requires an intervention to 
make the last term of (21) vanish. This is even true in the absence of other market failures. 
The standard fix of this problem is to use income redistribution     to equalize MUIs (De 
Palma and Lindsey, 2004; Anas, 2012).  
To see why this may not work in our spatial model, let us consider the case without 
any externalities and introduce transfers     to equalize MUIs, the standard intervention to 
efficiently deal with heterogeneity. Head tax revenue is 
ij ijij
N P y dollars. In this case, it 
turns out that we should rewrite (21) as  
Cov
ij
ijM ij
dPN dW
Ny
c d d 
        (22) 
Note that (22) contains  ij ijijN y dP d  , a new term which does not exist in (21). In 
other words, introducing transfers to equalize MUIs is not a device to ensure efficiency 
because it forces households to relocate, thereby altering the type composition of households. 
Now, let us introduce infrastructure congestion with Pigouvian pricing and equalize 
MUIs through transfers. The first-order rate of welfare change is given by (14), where the 
second last term, (d), continues to survive under the conventional rule (i.e., marginal cost 
pricing coupled with redistribution): 
ij
ijM ij
dPN dW
Ny
c d d 
  .      (23) 
This raises the question of why the conventional intervention works in De Palma and 
Lindsey (2004) but fails to work in our model. De Palma and Lindsey (2004) restore market 
efficiency by using congestion tolls and income redistribution in the transportation market 
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where travelers “differ with respect to wages, values of travel time, and the congestion 
characteristics of their vehicles.” Despite these differences in heterogeneity, in their setting, 
redistribution did not alter the composition of heterogeneous travelers, that is, 0ijdP  in 
our terms. In contrast, the policy intervention in our setting perturbs the commuting 
arrangements (location pattern), so the type composition of households ijP  is altered 
implying that 0ijdP  for all ( , )i j  pairs. Therefore, Pigouvian congestion pricing and 
income redistribution only make (a), (b), (c), and (e) in (14) vanish, while leaving the spatial 
re-sorting term (d) intact. The result is (23). Note here that although 0ijij dP d  , 
  0ij ijij Ny dP d   does not necessarily follow.  
Proposition 2 (Efficiency, heterogeneity and spatial re-sorting) 
1) As a result of household heterogeneity, the free market equilibrium fails to 
achieve maximum welfare even in the absence of market failures. 
2) As a result of spatial re-sorting, the conventional rule (i.e., Pigouvian tolls 
plus redistribution to equalize MUIs) alters the type composition of 
households and is not guaranteed to be first-best. Consequently, any policy 
mix is a candidate for the first-best, and only numerical simulations or 
empirical testing can tell which policy mix is welfare maximizing. 
We can interpret our result in a more general way. In any model where households 
are heterogeneous but can choose which type of household they belong to, the same problem 
may arise. There are many examples of this sort: mode, route, vehicle, and housing type 
choices, as well as marriage, parenting, and education. Hence, our finding should have 
consequences for many other issues as well. 
 
3.2.3. Other consequences of the heterogeneity in spatial models: Pigouvian tolls  
Would the presence of heterogeneity increase or decrease, say, Pigouvian tolls? It is 
clear from the welfare change formulas that the planner has to adjust the tolls so as to 
increase the covariance term as far as possible. Using transportation jargon, this clearly 
implies that Pigouvian tolls are likely to be suboptimal in the presence of “user” 
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heterogeneity. We illustrate this point using a simple example.  
For the sake of exposition, suppose that the city has two zones, where zone 1 is the 
monocentric center with mixed land use and zone 2 has residences only. Further, assume that 
 /ij i ijij jA d dg dw   in (16), 2t   (congestion charge at zone 2) and that there is a 
fixed number of commute trips in zone 1 so that the traffic at the CBD is, say,   (= 
population of the city). As                   , the welfare change associated with the 
covariance due to the change in 2t  is  
Cov 2t       2 2M M M Mij ij ij ij ij ij ij
ij ij
tP c c A EA c tP c A       
  221 21 21
2
( )
21 2
M M dgP c c d
dt
w t

   . 
Workers are paid the same wage in zone 1. However, zone 2 residents pay higher 
travel costs which lower their value of time and, thus, reduces their labor supply; we expect 
that zone 2 residents’ net income is lower, thus, 21 0 
M Mc c . Therefore, a positive toll 
2 0t   adds more welfare, and the household heterogeneity requires the planner to set the 
edge zone tolls above the Pigouvian toll. This will result in a more centralized city. However, 
it is not clear at all in what specific way the heterogeneity affects the policy prescription in 
the full model, although one finds a statement that heterogeneity tends to have a moderating 
effect on congestion (De Palma and Lindsey 2004: 135). 
3.2.4. Other consequences of the heterogeneity in spatial models: self-financing  
Spatial re-sorting 0ijdP   also makes the self-financing rule break down in our 
setting since Pigouvian pricing as well as standard capacity expansion is not optimal. Assume  
(i) service qualities, B
i,  , 1
H
i iS S g , are further assumed to stay constant with regard to 
proportionate changes in capacities and patronage,
7
 (ii) congestion is fully priced, (iii) 
income is suitably redistributed so as to make the MUIs all equal across heterogeneous 
households, and (iv) infrastructure (roads and nonroads) is expanded until the marginal 
                                           
7
 When simultaneously doubling and tripling the road lanes and the number of cars on roads does not change 
the travel speed, this condition is met, as is true in the congestion function a la the Bureau of Public Roads.  
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expansion costs are equal to the reduced marginal congestion cost (Yang and Meng 2002; see 
(17)-(18) above). In this case self-financing holds, but efficiency is not achieved.  
 
Proposition 3 (Self-financing) 
By following the conventional rule of pricing externalities, sizing 
infrastructure and transferring incomes to equalize MUIs, the infrastructure 
budget is balanced (i.e., self-financed). However, this arrangement is no 
longer efficient on account of spatial re-sorting. 
 
Later, we see that the arrangement following the conventional rule could be even 
disastrous. 
 
3.2.5. Elasticity rule for Pigouvian nonroad tolls 
Approximating the covariance term by zero, we can derive an elasticity rule for 
optimal nonroad tolls. Suppose that cross effects 0B Hi i i iS H S B      . Then, we can 
write from (21) 
( )
X
X i
i i
B B
i
i
i
S
p
B
p x

 
 
 
 , 
( )
H H
i i i
H
i
i
i
S
N
H
p 

 
 
 
 ,     
which implies 
Zonal output value
per floor area
Zonal infra benefit
per floor area
/
/
/
/
B B X
i i i
H H H H H
i i i i i i i
X
i i
X X X X X
i i i i i i i i i i
H
i i
H
i
iii i
i
B S
p S x B S B Sp x p B
H SN N Hp S H S
S H
 
   




    ,   (24) 
where 
X X
i i i ip S x B is the value of zonal output per office floor area and 
H
i i i iN S H  is the 
zonal nonroad infrastructure benefits per housing floor area that iN  households of zone   
experience as a whole. (24) has the following implications
8
: 
                                           
8 The covariance term as well as the spatial re-location term imply that Pigouvian tolls are not first-best, while 
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Summary 1 (Elasticity rule) Assume zero covariance and zero cross effects. 
1) Property taxes are proportional to the elasticities of the service 
qualities in floor areas. This proportionality is weighted by the value of 
affected economic welfare, which are output values in the case of 
offices and residential service utilities in the case of housing.   
2) There is no a priori reason to believe that business properties should be 
taxed more or less than housing. 
4. Analysis of the Second-Best Regimes 
4.1. Theory 
In light of the first-order welfare change (14), we may refer to the congestion tolls 
on building structures (i.e., (a) and (b) in (14)) as differentiated property taxes levied on 
congestible local public services. That is, we can regard property taxes as a type of 
congestion charge. In the real world, property taxes are not necessarily sufficiently 
differentiated among property types and localities. To take an extreme example, let 
H B
i i     
(constant) for all zones i  and all property types. Even in this case, however, we 
expect the welfare performance of this tax scheme not to be poor. The reason is that although 
the tax rate   is fixed, the tax bill per unit of floor area, , H Bi ip p  , is higher in the central 
business district (CBD) than in suburbs. So, the congestion charge continues to be higher in 
the CBD than in the suburbs
9
.  
Concerning zoning, imagine that there is a city called Zoning City, where the only 
instruments available are zoning instruments 
#
1, , ,{ , }
H B H zones
k k
B
k k k ks f f f f  , which are residential 
land shares ks  in nonroad land, maximum FARs ,  
H B
k kf f , and minimum FARs ,  
H B
k kf f  in 
each zone k . Superscripts , H B  denote housing and office (business) buildings, 
respectively. In the Zoning City, the LURs are fully differentiated over different zones and 
                                                                                                                                   
in some studies where spatial heterogeneity is present Pigouvian terms are said to be first-best (Anas and Xu, 
1999; Anas and Rhee, 2006, 2007). Anas (2012) also states that transfers to equalize MUI are usually not con-
sistent with Pigouvian tolling and that the Henry-George Theorem does not hold in this case. Our study reveals 
that the reason for this outcome is the spatial misallocation resulting from equalization transfers. 
9 We refer readers interested in spatial analysis of the second-best optimal property tax system to other literature 
(e.g., Kono and Pines, 2013). 
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property types, and infrastructure is financed by head tax. After modifying the utility 
maximization problem and market equilibrium conditions in accordance with the Zoning 
City’s setup, the planner maximizes welfare W  with respect to the zoning instruments:   
  
#
1
, , ,max , H B
zones
k
H B
k k k kk
f f fW fs

      (25) 
subject to (a) market equilibrium conditions, 
(b) fixed infrastructural capacities. 
 The rates of welfare change with respect to the regulatory instruments are as follows: 
MEC by an extra MEC by an extra i iH B
X H X H
X Xi i i i i i
i i i i i iM
i ik i i k i i k
i i
S S dH S S dBN dW
p x N p x N
c ds H H ds B B ds
 
      
      
      
    
 
     Size of 
distorted MEC in traffic rents
CovH B LSi k k k k
i
i k
i
i
i
dF
r r A
g
w F
dF s
 
     
 


 , (26) 
X H X H
X Xi i i i i i
i i i i i iM B B Bi i
i ik i i k i i k
S S dH S S dBN dW
p x N p x N
c df H H df B B df
 
      
      
      
    
 
Marginal compliance cost
CovB B Max B B M FARBi k
ini
i i k k k k
i
B
i k
dF
d
g
Q Q
f
w F
F
   
  
    
 
 ,  (27) 
(.)
i
X H X H
X Xi i i i i i
i i i i i iM H H H
i ik i i
i
i k i k
S S dH S S dBN dW
p x N p x N
c df H H df B B df
 
      
      
      
    
 
Marginal compliance cost
CovH H Max H H Mini i
FARH
i
i
kk k
k
k kH
i
dF
w F g Q Q
df
   
 
     
 
 . (28) 
H
kf  could be either the maximum FAR 
H
kf  or the minimum FAR 
H
kf  for housing, 
whichever is applicable. When the maximum FAR regulation is binding, 1, 0Max Min    
in the second lines of (27)–(28); when the minimum FAR regulation is binding, 
0, 1Max Min   . The first three terms in each formula of (26)–(28) are the first three terms 
in (14) with the Pigouvian taxes set to zero. , 
H B
k kr r  are unit rents of residential and business 
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land in zone k, respectively. The terms before the covariance terms are new terms appearing 
in the Zoning City. They show the regulatory costs arising from distorted real estate markets. 
Marginal compliance costs, , k k  , are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the 
maximum and minimum FAR regulations, respectively, that appear in (1). We, further, see 
that the zoning instruments interact with each other via its effects on services (structures) and 
congestion.  
We can discuss the regulatory terms in (26)–(28) a little more. Suppose that starting 
at a situation with a positive regulative allocation of land to residential use, 1 0s  , more 
land is allocated to residential use in zone 1 (that is, higher 1s  with 1 0s  ). Then, the 
residential land rent there will fall c.p. and the business land rent will rise with 1 1 0
H Br r  . In 
this case, 11 1( ( ) ( )) 0
H B sr r      , so this land share adjustment is accompanied by the 
welfare loss from zone 1’s land market. When, starting at 1 0s  the residential share in zone 
1 is adjusted downward instead, we continue to have 11 1( ( ) ( )) 0
H B sr r      . Similarly, the 
last terms in (27)–(28) are easily shown to be always negative for a small adjustment of the 
LURs. The intuition is that every binding regulation causes compliance costs because it 
forces the producers to adjust their operation in a direction they do not want. 
Summary 2 (Analytical structure) 
1) Pricing and quantity instruments work on the same variables to reduce 
congestion: volume of structures and traffic.  
2) However, the LURs have additional terms associated with the 
distortionary cost of real estate markets (structures and land). 
4.2. Discussion 
4.2.1. Implications for applied models 
Before proceeding, we note that (14) and (26)–(28) were derived by adding 
individual market effects over different markets using the differential equation (3). Finally, 
all the market effects cancel out, and only those representing market imperfections show up. 
In this sense, the first-order welfare changes as formulated in (14) and (26)–(28) are an 
envelope result of the general equilibrium land-use-transportation model à la Anas and Kim 
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(1996). Because the result is of the envelope type, we do not need all the market information 
to calculate the welfare impact of a policy; we need only the impacts on market imperfections, 
already present or newly introduced. 
Summary 3 (Envelope result)  
Calculating the general equilibrium welfare change requires only 
information of market imperfections, existing or newly introduced. 
The envelope result has one important implication on the applied research using the 
land-use and transportation models. One common platform used in this class of models is the 
spatial input–output framework, in which a regional economy is composed of a closely knit 
network with interregional and interindustry linkages.0F
10
 One problem with this ambitious 
modeling effort is the huge and demanding data set required to run the models, which is 
mostly unavailable. Now, note that the first-order derivatives (14), (26)–(28) have no terms, 
at least ostensibly, related with interregional and interindustry technical linkages. 
Reformulating the original production function ( , )Xi i i iX S x B M  so as to consider these 
linkages, we continue to have the identical derivatives (14) and (26)–(28) due to the zero 
profits. Therefore, there is some room to compromise the burdensome data requirement with 
the theoretical rigor of the applied models. 
Therefore, we could measure the net welfare gain or loss differently from Echenique 
et al. (2012) and Jun (2012). For example, Jun (2012) evaluates the welfare impact of the 
restricted provision of land for factories in the capitol region of Korea. To calculate the 
production loss, he required regional input–output data. The formulas in (26)–(28) state 
instead that it is enough to measure the distortionary cost of the real estate markets affected. 
In the case of land supply restriction, Jun (2012) already has zonal areas kA  (second last 
term in (26)). Because the only imperfection in his model is traffic congestion, which can be 
calculated easily in our approach, the only challenging task is to measure the multiplicative 
term ( )H Bk kr r  in (26). 
                                           
10
 There is voluminous literature on the benefits and costs of smart growth and compact development in the 
planning field (Ewing and Cervero, 2010; OECD, 2012). However, Echenique et al. (2014) and Jun (2012) are 
the only studies that, to the authors’ knowledge, analyze together the economic costs and benefits of LURs with-
in one modeling framework of regional economies. 
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4.2.2. Implications in the monocentric city: links to the literature 
The existing literature on the FAR regulations is predominantly monocentric with no 
business land use. To link our discussion to the literature and to gain more insight, imagine a 
city composed of two zones, where zone 1 (CBD) accommodates both office buildings and 
housing and zone 2 is completely residential
11
. Furthermore, suppose that the number of 
workdays ijd  is fixed at d  to be tractable and to fit standard monocentric approaches. 
Because of the fixed number of working days, zone 1’s traffic volume is fixed at 1F N  at 
each working day. This is equivalent to the standard monocentric model’s setup, in which 
traffic volume is usually fixed at N  at the CBD point. 
Assume that LURs 1 1 1 2( ; , ; )
B H Hs f f f  are the only policies available and that the 
covariance terms are negligible. Now, imagine that the city planner slightly adjusts land 
shares and FARs prevailing in the free markets with the aim of improving welfare. Since 1F  
is fixed, 1 d 0/dF   ,  1 1 21 , ,, B H Hs f f f   and the associated welfare changes are shown as 
W nonroad ext. 1s +  2 1 1 1
1
(
2
)
1 2 1 1
0
H Bw
dF
r r A
d
g s s
s
F


 
    

 

,   (27) 
W nonroad ext. 1
Hf +  21 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
(
0
1
)
H H H Max H H Min H
H
w F g f Q
dF
d
Q f
f
   


 
  

   

, (28) 
W nonroad ext. 2
Hf  +  21 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
(
0
2
)
H H H Max H H Min H
H
w F g f Q
dF
d
Q f
f
   


 
  

   

, (29) 
W nonroad ext. 1
Bf  +  1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
2
1
B B B Max B B Min B
B
w F g f Q
dF
f
f
Q
d
   

   
 
  
 
. (30) 
1s  is the discrete change in zone 1’s residential land share. The other notations are 
interpreted in the same way. (27)–(30) reveals the interplay between different types of 
congestion and different zoning policies. We can use these equations to reproduce different 
                                           
11
 This setup is more general than most existing models, in which the CBD is described as a point, meaning that 
the whole metropolitan land is used exclusively for residences. 
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results from the literature by adjusting assumptions. 
 For instance, in case of traffic congestion only, the first terms in (27)–(30) vanish. 
Because the last terms are all negative in (27)–(30), the only way the LURs can improve 
welfare is to make the second terms in (27)–(30) positive. This immediately implies 1 0
Hf   
from (28) (a minimum FAR regulation in the center) and 2 0
Hf   from (29) (a maximum 
FAR regulation at suburbs). Our assumptions concerning 2F  are 2 1/ 0
HF f    and 
2 2/ 0
HF f   , i.e. higher buildings in the CBD and lower buildings in suburbs pushes people 
into the CBD, thus, lowering traffic in suburbs. This reproduces the prescription to 
metropolitan-wide road congestion in the monocentric literature (e.g., Pines and Kono, 2012; 
Kono et al, 2012). Our theory shows that this outcome is valid only when the increase in 
density in the CBD does not cause the service quality of nonroads at the city center to 
deteriorate (see the first terms in (26)–(28) and (27)–(30)). When such adjustment congests 
the CBD too much, it could be even better to decentralize activities from the CBD to other 
zones, as in Anas and Rhee’s (2007) case of growth boundaries. 
If there is no road congestion, the second terms vanish in (27)–(30). Lowering 
density by maximum FAR is then the prescription where maximum FAR is tighter in the 
CBD (see Kono et al. (2010) for “population” externalities). In this way, our model allows 
evaluating zoning in the presence of two types of congestion. Optimal zoning policy then 
depends on the relative strength of congestion types as well as on the instrument mix 
available, as we show next. 
4.2.3. Optimal adjustment of land uses  
Convert the first-order derivative, say, (26) into a new formula composed of 
elasticities and shares of external costs as follows: 
Total transp.
cost 
Agg. land
reof zone nt of zone 
,       i k i k ki kki i i g s
i
H B
i H s i B s k A s
i i ik
k
dW
EC w F gEC ALR
ds
 (31) 
where  / /H X X Hi i i i i i i i iiEC p x S H N S H H      is the external cost present in zone i’s 
nonroad infrastructure due to the marginal adjustment in housing stock iH ; 
B
iEC  is the 
external cost present in zone i’s nonroad infrastructure due to the marginal office stock 
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change iB ; and [ (1 )]
H B
k k k k k kALR r s r s A   is the aggregate land rent of zone k, while    , 
   ,    ,     are the elasticities of housing stock, office stock, congestion and aggregate 
land rents w.r.t. the share of land usable for housing    (land-use type regulation) The 
coefficient terms before the elasticities in (31) play the role of relative weights when the 
elasticities are added over all markets and externalities.  
The FAR regulations have the similar expression. Denote by    
 ,    
 ,    
 ,    
  the 
elasticities of the housing stock, office stock, congestion and the office floor area with respect 
to to the FAR regulation in zone   on housing, respectively. Then, we have 
Total transp. Total compliance cost of
cost in zone zone 's 
Floor ar
housing builde
e
s
a
r
(.)
       H H H H H H
i k i k i k k k i k
H B
i i
i i
H H H H H
i i i
H H
k kH H f B f g f f Q
k
k
f
i
i
kEC EC w F g
d
f
f
W
d
Q .  (32) 
We can derive a similar formula for the FAR regulation of office buildings, 
B
kf .  
Summary 4 (Optimal adjustment of LURs)  
The planner should adjust the LURs, , ,
H B
k k kf f s , so as to make (31)–(32) 
positive, while assigning more weight to the terms with higher cost shares 
and higher elasticities. 
In summary, Pigouvian tolls as well as property taxes mimicking Pigouvian tolls are 
only second best because they cannot consider differences in MUIs, and because property 
taxes fail to account fully for traffic congestion. In addition, land-use regulations entail 
compliance costs and, thus, cannot be first best even if they were to account for household 
heterogeneity. Considering the sheer complexity of the model, we cannot decide of whether 
zoning is as efficient as Pigouvian tolls. To explore this issue, we now turn to numerical 
exercises. 
5. Numerical Examination 
5.1. Calibration 
We examine a hypothetical metropolitan area, linear in shape, which accommodates a 
population of 1.2 million in a fully circular nonmonocentric metropolitan area. The 
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population density is 14 persons/hectare. The population is smaller than mid-sized American 
metropolitan areas and density is set accordingly. We use a Cobb–Douglas function for the X-
good producers, 1Xi i i iX S M B
  . Housing builders produce housing according to the CES-
technology 
     
1/
1
H
H HH
Hk kk H
HQ XH

 
    
  
.      
Office buildings kB  are produced similarly to housing. We use the utility function 
1/
( l nln 1 ) n l
U
U U
ij
H
ij U ij U ij iu z h l S

          .    
With no harm to the major point of the study, we set the number of workdays ijd  at 20.8 
days a month. 
 
Table 1 Reference parameters 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Geography and Population 
Zone 1 & 5: 7 km, Zone 2 & 4: 5 km, Zone 3: 4 km 
N  1.2 million persons (2 dependents/household) 
Population density: 14.0 persons/hectare on average (endogenous in each zone) 
Production 
X-good producers: 0.8   (labor cost share), 
1 0.2   (land cost share) 
Builders of housing and office buildings: Land cost share = 30% 
 H B   -0.923 (elasticity of factor substitution = 0.52) 
H  0.875, B 0.915 
Household-workers  
Household income = $50,000/year 
Housing expenditure = 30% of the household income 
Utility function:  0.4,   0.6, U  -0.786, U  0.475  
Time endowment T = 500 hours/month 
Number of workdays: 20.8d   days/month 
 6 (dispersion parameter) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
We adjust the cost shares and elasticities of substitution according to empirical stud-
ies and consumer expenditure surveys (Koenker, 1972; Shoven and Whalley, 1977; Polinsky 
and Ellwood, 1979; McDonald, 1981; Thorsnes, 1997). We specify the service qualities of 
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infrastructure as  
XX
i X i i iS a K B H

    and  
HH
i H i i iS a K B H

    . In line with Yeoh 
and Stansel (2013), we choose  0,0.11X  . More problematic is to set the coefficients of 
the function HiS . We resolve the difficulties in setting the coefficients , , , X HX Ha a   in 
such a way that the uniform property tax rate of 0.95%, as applied to the stock value of prop-
erties, covers the cost of infrastructure (roads and nonroads together). We use a discount rate 
of 5% to convert tax rates into flow rates. We use the Bureau of Public Roads function for the 
congested travel time,  ,i ig F R . Table 1 displays the parameters used for the simulations. 
 
Table 2. Technical details of the simulations 
(a) Section 5.2 
City type Road budget Nonroad budget Road tolls Prop. tax rates 
Base City Roads and nonroads all financed by head tax  No tolls No prop. tax 
Tolled City 
Road tolls exactly 
cover road budget in 
each zone. 
Prop. taxes exactly 
cover nonroad budg-
et in each zone. 
Endogenous
1
 
First-best 
City 
Road and nonroad tolls charged in the same 
way as the Tolled City. 
Endogenous (income  
redistribution used too) 
PT City 
Prop. tax rev. = sum of metro-wide  
road and nonroad budgets 
No road tolls Endogenous 
Zoning City, 
LS only 
Financed with head tax Neither road tolls nor prop. taxes 
Note: Capacities of nonroads in the Tolled City are determined by (17)-(18). Capacities of road and 
nonroads of the other cities follow those of the Tolled City. 
 
(b) Section 5.3 
City type Road budget Nonroad budget Road tolls Prop. tax rates 
Base City Roads and nonroads all financed by head tax No tolls No prop. tax 
Tolled City 
Not necessarily  
balanced
1
 
Prop. taxes exactly 
cover nonroad budg-
et in each zone. 
Policy 
variable 
Endogenous
2
 
PT City 
Financed with head and prop. taxes; prop. 
taxes ≠ sum of road and nonroad budgets. 
No road tolls 
Policy 
Variable 
Zoning City, 
LS only 
Financed with head tax Neither road tolls nor prop. taxes 
1
 Any budget deficit or surplus of the city is equally shared among the residents in the form of head 
tax (deficit) or government transfer (surplus). 
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2
 Although nonroad capacities are fixed here, land rents and the prices of capital inputs are not fixed in 
our general equilibrium model. So, property tax rates are “endogenous” to cover variable input costs. 
 
 
 
5.2. Efficiencies when optimal policies are known  
5.2.1. Basic Simulations 
We perform simulations to compare the efficiencies of LURs, congestion charges, 
and uniform property taxes which are often used in reality. We define five types of city: 
Zoning City, PT (property tax) City, Tolled City, Base City and First-best City.  
The Tolled City sets Pigouvian congestion charges for roads and nonroads while 
balancing the road and nonroad budgets in each zone separately and adjusting capacities, too 
((17)-(18) hold). In this city, all the terms except for the last two terms in (14) are set equal to 
zero. In the model with no user heterogeneity, this scheme is not only self-sufficient but also 
first best. All other types of cities use the same level of road and nonroad capacities as the 
Tolled City in order to avoid experimental noise that might be introduced by differing 
infrastructural capacities.  
In the PT City, traffic congestion is not priced and a single uniform property tax rate 
is applied to both residential and business properties irrespective of the location of a structure. 
This rate is set so as to precisely cover the combined expenditure for roads and nonroads in 
the metropolitan area. In the Zoning City, the planner knows the optimal mix of LURs and 
adjusts residential land shares is  and FARs , 
H B
i if f  in each zone to maximize welfare (6). 
The expenditure for roads and nonroads is financed with a head tax. In the First-best City, 
congestion externalities are fully priced as in the Tolled City. In addition, the last two terms 
are set to zero as well by income redistribution ijy , meaning that the sum of all the terms in 
(14) vanishes in the First-best City. The Base City is the laissez-faire city where none of the 
policies is available and infrastructure is financed by head taxes. Table 2(a) summarizes the 
major features of the cities. 
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Table 3. Land use patterns of the Base and Zoning Cities under reference population 
(a) Land use 
Zone 3 (CBD) 4 5 
Share of 
business 
land 
Base City 0.15 0.32 0.49 
Zoning City 0.14 0.30 0.46 
Tolled City 0.15 0.32 0.49 
Share of 
residential 
Land 
Base City 0.39 0.54 0.50 
Zoning City 0.40 0.56 0.53 
Tolled City 0.39 0.54 0.51 
Note: In the Base City, roads’ land share at the CBD = 1− (business land 0.15 + residential land 0.39) 
= 0.46 (=46%). The land for roads in zone 1 and 5 is of pretty small size less than 1% of the total 
zonal land area. 
 
(b) Floor area ratios 
Zone 3 (CBD) 4 5 
Business 
buildings 
Base City 0.69 0.49 0.17 
Zoning City 0.70 0.47 0.15 
Tolled City 0.69 0.48 0.17 
Residential 
buildings 
Base City 0.66 0.45 0.15 
Zoning City 0.68 0.43 0.13 
Tolled City 0.66 0.44 0.14 
Note: The entries for the Zoning City are optimal LURs, strictly binding to every builder and 
landowner. The FAR numbers here are just indexes and the absolute size carries no meaning.  
 
Figure 1 Welfare performance
(a) Welfare gain
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Table 3 shows that the Zoning City only minimally adjusts land uses and floor area 
ratios compared to the Base City. Figure 1(a) shows the welfare gains that various types of 
city attain over and above the Base City’s welfare. Zoning and property taxes are shown to 
move from being more efficient than to being as efficient as and, eventually, to being less 
efficient than Pigouvian pricing (i.e., the Tolled City) as metropolitan population increases. 
This means two things. First, zoning is almost as efficient as Pigouvian tolls. This coincides 
with the existing literature. For example, Kono et al. (2012) show that FAR regulations in the 
monocentric city achieve 80% of the welfare gain obtained by the first-best city. According to 
Rhee et al. (2014), land share adjustment together with production subsidies achieve 99% of 
the first-best instruments’ welfare gain. However, the proposition that zoning is almost as 
efficient as Pigouvian tolls is valid over only a narrow range of metropolitan population. Se-
cond, it is surprising that Pigouvian congestion charges (i.e., the Tolled City) could be less 
efficient than zoning, which has not been reported in the literature. This cannot occur in the 
model without heterogeneity. 
 
Summary 5 (Equivalence of LURs and Pigouvian tolls)  
When optimal policies are known, zoning could be more efficient than, as 
efficient as, or less efficient than Pigouvian tolls. That is, in contrast to the 
finding in the theoretic literature that zoning is very efficient (Pines and 
Sadka, 1985; Wheaton, 1998; Kono et al., 2012; Rhee et al., 2014), zoning 
could be far less efficient than pricing instruments for large cities. 
Conversely, zoning could be more efficient than congestion charges for small 
cities. 
 
5.2.2. Discussion: covariance term and real estate market distortions 
The covariance term explains the apparent anomalies in Figure 1(a). To see this more 
clearly, we create a straight path of the LUR policy changes, parameterized by  , from the 
Base City to the Zoning City, and path integrate the welfare function along this straight line 
using (26)–(28) (Yu and Rhee, 2013). In Figure 1(b),  =0 is the Base City, and     is the 
Zoning City. The curve “Systematic” is welfare explained by the first four terms in concert in 
(26)–(28); the curve “Covariance” is welfare explained by the covariance terms in (26)–(28). 
The covariance part explains 38% of the welfare gain of the Zoning City over the Base City 
(i.e., BC/AC=0.38). This share is astonishingly large and is shown to increase even further as 
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population increases. 
How do the anomalies in the equivalence results arise? In smaller cities with lower 
externalities, zoning improves on redistribution effects in the presence of household 
heterogeneity while market distortions are relatively small. With increasing city size 
externalities increase and zoning becomes less and less efficient compared to Pigouvian tolls 
because redistribution effects become relatively less important and land market distortions or 
compliance costs increase fast (the dotted curve in Figure 1(b)). The same applies to property 
taxes. Because the zoning city applies a policy mix that is better than any single zoning 
instrument our finding holds also for any policy applying only a single zoning instrument as 
considered in the literature on zoning. 
As a reference, we also report a zoning city in which only land shares is  are 
adjusted. The “LS only” curve represents that city in Figure 1(a). Comparing the Zoning City 
curve with the LS Only curve suggests that the efficiency gain of the Zoning City arises 
mostly from FAR regulations. Figure 1(a) simply shows that any policy not considering 
household heterogeneity would fail to improve welfare much. 
5.2.3. Discussion: breakdown of the conventional rule (spatial distortions) 
Household heterogeneity renders the conventional rule for correcting the congestion 
externalities disastrous. In the nonspatial model where the market intervention does not alter 
the type composition of user heterogeneity, the combination of congestion charges and 
income redistribution, i.e., the conventional rule, restores efficient market outcomes. In the 
Tolled City, we fully priced congestion externalities, so the first three summations in (14), 
(a)+(b)+(c), vanished. In the First-best City, we also made the sum of the remaining two 
terms in (14), (d)+(e), zero using income transfer ijy . In contrast, the conventional rule 
makes only (a)+(b)+(c)+(e) vanish in our spatial model, while ignoring the spatial re-sorting 
term, (d)  ij ii jjNy dP d  .  
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Figure 2 Conventional rule breaks down.
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Let us examine how problematic the conventional rule is in our spatial model. As the 
utility function is Cobb-Douglas, the MUI is the inverse of household income. Building upon 
this observation, we vary differences in MUIs through redistribution to lower the difference 
between richer and poorer households in addition to Pigouvian tolling. Figure 2 shows the 
results when we successively add or subtract a fixed amount of income, say $100 dollars. 
When there is no re-sorting, the covariance term vanishes and welfare reaches its maximum if 
income is equal, that is, the maximum income difference is zero. However, as Figure 2 shows, 
welfare does not increase but declines the smaller this difference. The reason is the relocation 
of households as a response to redistribution. The highest point in Figure 2 marks the First-
best City where the last two terms (e)+(d) vanish on account of redistribution
12
. Figure 2 
demonstrates that setting (a)+(b)+(c)+(e) to zero according to the conventional rule, is 
disastrous when the spatial re-sorting term is ignored in the model where type composition 
itself varies in response to a policy intervention. 
 
                                           
12
 The highest point in the figure does not look like $308, which should be the intercept of the curve First-best 
in Figure 1(a). The reason is that we did not normalize the household income to $50,000/year for easier compu-
ting. 
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6. Instrument Choice: Efficiencies When Optimal Policies Are Not Known 
6.1. Setup 
In Subsection 5.2, the planner could pinpoint an optimal policy (first-best or second-
best policy). In reality, however, the instrument choice and actual implementation are not free 
of hindrance and complications due to various reasons: imperfect property rights, multiple 
externalities, market power, unobservable behavior, imperfect information, administrative 
capacity, and politics (Fischel, 1985: ch.10; Bennear and Stavins, 2007). Further issues are 
discussed in the political economy of instrument choice (e.g., influence of lobbying groups by 
Grossman and Helpman, 1994; overview of transport literature by Hepburn, 2006). 
Consequently, the instrument level chosen is likely to deviate from the theoretic optimum. In 
this subsection, we consider this issue and explore its consequences for the optimal 
instrument design. 
To evaluate the welfare impact of deviations from optimal policies, we choose the 
following experimental setting. Imagine three cities each with 1.2 million inhabitants and the 
same road and nonroad capacity as the Tolled City in Section 5.2. The first city, Base City, 
uses spatially differentiated property taxes to finance local road and nonroad infrastructure. 
Neither other taxes nor transfers are available. 
In the second city, Tolled City, the planner sets road tolls to maximize welfare W in 
(6), while considering the covariance term and collecting spatially differentiated property 
taxes to balance nonroad budgets in each zone. As these road tolls take into account the 
covariance term, the road tolls deviate from Pigouvian tolls; any surplus or deficit from road 
tolls is redistributed. In this Tolled City, we assume that income transfer is not available. 
Because the planner sets the road tolls considering the covariance term and ignoring the road 
budget balance, the welfare is higher than that of Figure 1(a). In Figure 1(a), road and 
nonroad budgets were all constrained to be exactly balanced in each zone. Next, we vary road 
tolls in each zone around these second-best tolls that we just obtained, and calculate changes 
in welfare caused by deviations from the second-best road tolls. Here, the tolls set differ from 
the standard Pigouvian tolls equaling marginal external cost of congestion
13
  
                                           
13 Of course, this higher welfare cannot happen in the model with homogeneous households where balanced 
budgets and full pricing are two salient features of the first-best city when the service quality stays the same 
with the proportionate change in infrastructure capacity and patronage. 
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The third city, PT City, levies spatially uniform property taxes but does not charge 
road tolls. This type of city is observed more commonly in the real world. It varies the tax 
rates for housing H  and business buildings 
B  and uses head tax recycling to maximize 
welfare. The intention is to check the sensitivity of the welfare change in the setting where 
the city is minimally constrained in using the property taxes. Table 2(b) summarizes the 
major features of the city types examined in this subsection. 
 
6.2. Theory 
To measure the welfare loss induced by deviations from optimal policies, we 
parameterize the congestion charges by 0b  , where 0b   corresponds to the Base City 
and 1b   to the Tolled City. Similarly, we parameterize the LURs by 0  , where 1   
corresponds to the Zoning City and (0,1)  corresponds to the Base City. 1F14 We perturb 
, b   around 1 and denote the welfare change by TolledW  for the Tolled City and by 
ZoningW  for the Zoning City. By construction, 0
TolledW   and 0
ZoningW  . We express 
these differentials up to the second order of the parameters to obtain 
 
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2
1
1
2
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Tolled
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
   ,   
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2
2
1
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d




   ,  (33) 
where , 
Tolled ZoningW W  are welfare of the Tolled and Zoning Cities, respectively. We collect 
the terms from (33) under the rubric of B  for benefits and C  for costs to obtain the 
formulas containing second-order terms similar to Weitzman (1974) and Laffont (1977). 
Implicit in our exercise is that uncertainties have been introduced into the policy instruments 
and that welfare is given for certainty. This means that welfare is ex post welfare. Unlike 
Weitzman (1974), this twist greatly facilitates the exposition, as we shall see. 
There are two reasons why (33) is not of much help. First, the general equilibrium 
nature of our framework is too complex to provide an unambiguous sign from analytics. 
Second, the policy intervention is discrete, so the local approximation (33) working only near 
the optimums could be completely wrong for the discrete changes introduced by the Zoning 
                                           
14
 The usage of   here slightly differs from its usage in Figure 1(b). In Figure 1(b), the Base City corresponds 
to 0  .   
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and Tolled Cities. Therefore, Weitzman and Laffont’s second-order formulas, which hold only 
around the optimums, do not allow obtaining the welfare differential with discrete changes. 
We have to rely on alternative ways to evaluate discrete derivations from optimal policies 
(see Pizer, 2002, for mitigating climate change). 
Once again, the first-order welfare changes (14), (26)–(28) show a way to get around 
this difficulty. One critical difference between (14) and (26)–(28) is that (14) has two terms, 
one positive and the other negative, mutually offset inside parentheses, but (26)–(28) do not. 
Because the terms inside parentheses of (14) cancel out at the optimum, the welfare change 
will be small in association with a given change in b, b , away from the optimum ( 1b  ). 
Note that (14) holds at any equilibrium near or far from the optimum. Figure 3 is a graphical 
illustration consistent with this observation in which the marginal benefit (MB) curve is lo-
cated close to the marginal cost (MC) curve in panel (a) and far apart from the marginal cost 
curve in panel (b). 
 
 
Figure 3 Deviation from optimal policies
(a) Congestion tolls (b) Land use regulations
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From previous simulations we can get some intuition. Table 3 shows that the Zoning 
City only slightly perturbs the Base City, and the dotted curve in Figure 1(b) indicates that 
when the deviation is large, the welfare cost by the second last terms in (26)–(28) will soon 
overwhelm all the other effects. Figure 3(b) is a graph consistent with this interpretation. To 
remind the readers, the two curves are located far apart compared to Figure 3(a). Again, note 
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that (26)–(28) hold at any point near or far from the optimum. Once we have a figure 
resembling Figure 3, we are likely to obtain a larger welfare loss in the Zoning City than in 
the Tolled City for the same given deviation b    . In the end, we need simulations to see 
whether we can corroborate this intuition. 
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6.3. Simulation 
We perform simulations to validate the insight provided by (14) and (26)–(28), or 
equivalently Figure 3. Indeed, Figure 4 confirms our conjecture. It shows new profiles of 
welfare gain over the Base City under the reference population of 1.2 million. On the 
horizontal axis, 1.2 means that policies were set 20% higher than the optimal values. The 
curve labeled “LS only” is the Zoning City, in which only land shares are perturbed, while 
FARs are fixed at the levels of Subsection 5.2. Conversely, if we perturb the FARs only and 
hold land shares fixed at the levels of Subsection 5.2, we obtain a shape closely following the 
“LS only” curve. So, we omit the “FAR only” curve in Figure 4. The city types relying on the 
tax instruments rarely experience large welfare losses compared to the second-best optimal 
welfare (approximately $220). It does not matter much whether the planner fails to pinpoint 
the optimal tax policies. In contrast, when the planner is wrong about the zoning policy, the 
cost is huge. Because a small deviation could bring about a strictly negative net benefit, 
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zoning could be even worse than doing nothing.  
One problem with Figure 4 is that all the policy instruments are inflated or deflated 
by the same ratio to obtain the graphs. To explore whether the outcome is robust to other 
pattern of deviation form optimal policy, we conduct another experiment. This time, we allow 
actual policies to deviate from the optimal policies by setting differing ratios among changes 
in the instruments. As pricing instruments are extremely insensitive to deviation (e.g., policy 
failure or information errors), it is sufficient to check the sensitivity of the LURs against the 
deviation. 
Now, we introduce discrete random variables , 1,2,3i i   that could be either 
positive or negative. This random variables can take values  0.15; 0.07;0;0.07;0.15   with 
equal probability of 1/5.
15
 We denote the optimal LURs (Zoning City) by 
is
  (residential 
land share), 
H
if

 (FAR of housing) and 
B
if

 (FAR of office buildings). Lacking the precise 
information of the second-best LURs, the planner adopts actual land-use controls as follows:  
 11i iss 
  ,  21
H
i
H
iff 
  ,  31
B
i
B
iff 
  , 
where i  denotes the percentage deviation from the optimal level of the instrument in the 
Zoning City. We randomly set all i  and calculate the associated welfare change from the 
Base City. We repeat this independently 20 times. At each trial, we measure the imprecision 
of zoning by  
2
1,2,3
1 ˆ00
i ii
 

 , where ˆi  is the average of i ’s. 
In Figure 5(a), we plot the 20 welfare changes resulting from this experiment against 
the degree of regulatory imprecision. Welfare is higher than the Base City in 7 trials (dots 
above the x-axis) and lower than the Base City in 13 trials (dots below the x-axis). Although 
the planner’s policy is correct on average, due to imprecision he loses on average $148 
(Figure 5(a)) instead of winning more than $200 (Figure 4). 
 
 
                                           
15
 This uniform distribution is not new at all. Refer to Pizer (2002: 415, 417) for a similar practice in estimating 
the costs and benefits of climate change mitigation. 
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Figure 5 Welfare loss of imprecise zoning
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Next, we vary the metropolitan population N , perform the same experiments 
leading to Figure 5(a), and tabulate the average welfare losses. Figure 5(b) is the result. We 
calculate the standard deviation of each experiment composed of twenty independent trials 
and superimpose the standard deviations on the average welfare losses. As in Figure 5(a), the 
planner always loses on average. The average loss and the standard deviation increase as the 
metropolitan area becomes more congested. We may narrow the range of the values that i  
takes on or we may use different (symmetric) distributions for i . Nonetheless, unless the 
range is much smaller than 0.15 , we obtain essentially the same results of welfare loss. 
The experimental results of the LURs coincide with what has been reported in the 
literature on metropolitan-wide development controls. For example, building height 
restriction in Bangalore, India has resulted in a loss of 1.5% to 4.5% of household income 
(Bertaud and Brueckner, 2005). Similar welfare costs are reported for the greenbelts around 
metropolitan areas in Seoul, Korea by Lee (1999) and in the UK by Cheshire and Sheppard 
(2002). One persistent difficulty is that it is not easy to set land use regulations optimally in 
the real world.  
While these studies calculate the costs of one single instrument of zoning, our study 
shows that a policy mix of zoning also bears costs. We further find that these costs can be 
more than compensated by benefits near the optimum zoning policy. However, net costs arise 
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if zoning is set away from the optimum. They increase more than proportionally to the 
deviation from optimal zoning. These findings are not yet reported in the zoning literature 
 
Summary 6  
1) Depending on policy accuracy, the efficiency ranking of the LURs and 
tax instruments varies greatly.  
2) Policy decision-making and the imperfectness of regulatory information 
needed for LURs or taxes might cause nonoptimal choice of zoning and 
taxes. The welfare costs of suboptimal zoning are so huge that zoning is 
strongly adverse compared to Pigouvian tolls and property taxes. It is 
even possible that zoning is worse than doing nothing at all. 
 
6.4. Instrument choice in pollution control and city planning  
The formulas (14) and (26)–(28) should not come as a surprise, because they are 
conceivable from Harberger (1971) and are related to the traditional view of instrument 
choice in environmental economics. Nevertheless, these formulas considerably extend the 
discussion of existing instrument choice literature; they provide a global platform that 
extends the instrument choice theory of pollution control to various types of externalities and 
to a wide range of policy deviations beyond cost-benefit uncertainties.  
Strictly speaking, Weitzman’s (1974) famous formula B C   holds only near the 
optimums. Many authors adopt this local formula to differentiate the global superiority of 
different policies (Hoel and Karp, 2002) or resort to graphs to draw global implications and 
conclusions (Stavins, 1996; Kaplow and Shavell, 2002). Pizer (2002) emphasizes the danger 
of this practice. He calculates that the welfare differential between prices and quantities is 
about five times larger with the linearization of Weitzman in contrast to the application of a 
full welfare analysis. 
This practice simply testifies to the difficulty in deriving formal expressions 
applicable to a discrete policy change. In the process, uncertainties of benefits and/or costs 
are introduced, only to have the same local characterization of the welfare differential 
between prices and permits (Laffont, 1977). In contrast, we examine deviations from optimal 
policies that might be caused by quite a number of different reasons found in the planning 
and decision process, such as lobbying or information failures. The trick was to incorporate 
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the uncertainties or imprecision into the policies rather than into the costs and benefits of 
pollution control. 
Let us illustrate how nicely (14) and (26)–(28) explain the superiority of prices to 
quantities in the instrument choice literature whose setting is much simpler than ours is. 
Again, Pizer (1997: 2) reports essentially the same simulations as ours in controlling 
greenhouse gases and summarizes that “slightly more stringent targets lead to dramatic 
welfare losses.” This is not a coincidence. Pizer sets the tax price equal to the almost constant 
marginal benefit of pollution abatement (Figure 5 in his report, a special case of our nonlinear 
marginal harm schedules). In addition, permits are bound to entail distortionary costs under 
uncertainties (the second-terms of (26)–(28) in our setting). Thus, the welfare calculus in 
Pizer’s study has essentially the same mathematical structure as our study of the cost–benefits 
associated with the two competing instruments, although the mathematical structure is not 
explicit in his study.  
Now, since the instruments solving the equation  (14) = 0 are first best and his 
pricing always equals the true marginal damages due to the flat marginal harm schedule, the 
flat pricing should work better than permits in Pizer, even under (cost) uncertainties. Because 
quantities entail not a small cost of market distortions, as the second-last terms in (26)–(28) 
show, the welfare differential should be large between pricing and permits. In other words, 
the same cost–benefit calculus applies to Pizer’s and our studies; it is natural that pricing 
works much better than permits in his study and climate control literature in general with 
stock pollutants, when either one of the instruments is to be used.  
Consequently, although (14) and (26)–(28) are intended to be discerning for nonstock 
externalities, they turn out to apply equally well to stock pollutants. Our theory and 
simulations show that these findings from environmental policies in principle carry over to 
congestion policies in a very different spatial framework that considers various nonstock 
externalities, land use, and heterogeneous households. It is in this sense that (14) and (26)–
(28) and Figure 3 provide a global platform that extends the instrument choice theory of 
pollution control to various types of externalities and to a wide range of policy deviations 
beyond cost-benefit uncertainties.  
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Summary 7 
1) The responsibility to control externalities differs between owners of 
individual facilities in the case of pollution control and public 
authorities managing infrastructure in our case. However, similar 
economics is at work, so that (14), (26)–(28) are equally applicable to 
the instrument choice in both environmental economics and city 
planning. 
2) The superiority of prices to quantities in controlling externalities stems 
from the cost–benefit structure of welfare changes, which is uniquely 
associated with each type of policy. 
7. Conclusion 
We found that some of the well-known results on congestion policies no longer hold 
if there are heterogeneous households, multiple land uses, and different types of congestion. 
It turns out that redistribution effects can be so large that any policy not considering 
redistribution is far from being first-best. This result demands further research to explore 
whether household heterogeneity has similarly strong implications on optimal policy design 
for other regulation issues. Furthermore, the result that even in a first-best framework 
Pigouvian taxes and redistribution to equalize marginal utilities of income do not provide a 
first-best solution, might be relevant for other cases in which re-sorting across heterogeneous 
household types is feasible (e.g., heterogeneity according to education status, family status, 
and income type). 
The findings concerning zoning are surprising. The outcome from the literature that 
zoning is almost as efficient as Pigouvian tolls is valid only for a narrow range of a city’s 
population. Furthermore, zoning could be even better than congestion charges. Such findings 
are not yet known in the literature. The findings point to the significance of redistribution 
issues when household heterogeneity is present. Consequently, some of the generally 
accepted findings are challenged. Whether this holds true for other regulation policies is an 
open issue. 
Policies might not be optimally set for various reasons, such as imperfect information, 
we provide an evaluation of the efficiency losses of deviations from optimal policy. We 
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conclude from this exercise that enacting zoning is a very risky undertaking because this 
regulation policy could worsen welfare below the no-policy case with congestion. This issue 
is serious, considering that zoning is a standard instrument in city and regional planning. 
Of course, land-use regulations usually have other objectives too, such as separation 
of incompatible uses. Our study is limited in this respect. However, even then, the efficiency 
problem remains and might offset all or part of the benefits that land-use planning intends to 
reap. The strong distortion that zoning imposes on real estate markets is the reason for the 
high welfare costs of small deviations from optimal regulation. The same distortionary cost 
will continue to work in models with other types of externalities, notably, production and 
consumption externalities, and in models of government competition among municipalities. 
We expect that this vulnerability of land-use regulations to non-optimal choice is 
relevant to policy of other types of regulation applied to various markets. This is already 
known with respect to misperception (e.g., Kaplow and Shavell, 2002). However, in our study, 
we show that any deviation for any reason from the optimal regulation causes this robustness 
problem of the instrument. Accordingly, further research is needed on the local robustness of 
other regulatory instruments around the optimum. We are confident that this issue is 
replicated in other markets and regulatory policies. Therefore, it could be a very common 
issue and should be considered when exploring optimal instrument design. 
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Appendix 1. Derivation of the first-order welfare change 
Form the Lagrangian of the household’s utility maximization problem. 
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We calculate each term of (11) one by one. An example follows. 
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We have applied the envelope theorem to have the formula. After calculating this type of de-
rivatives, we substitute them into (11). 
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Using (3) and the market equilibrium conditions, we can simplify the above as follows: 
The first seven terms of (11) 
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In the similar fashion, we can calculate the last term of (11). 
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Combine (34) and (35) to have the desired formula. We can derive the derivatives of the 
other policy variables in the similar fashion. 
 
 
 
Appendix 2. Glossary 
Abbreviations LUR land-use regulations; FAR floor area ratio; MUI marginal utility of in-
come 
Zone index , , ,i j k s  
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Transport ( , )i i i ig g F R  travel time in zone i  (hour/km), ijg  travel time between 
zone i  and j ; ,i ijt t  are tolls per kilometer similarly defined; ,i ijF F  
traffic volumes similarly defined; iR  road capacity in zone i ; iK  capaci-
ty of nonroad infrastructure such as water, sewage, power, gas, and tele-
communications that do not consume land per se 
Producers iX  composite goods = X-goods; iM  labor input to X-good production; iB  
building input to X-good production (unit: floor area); ,
H B
i iQ Q  land inputs 
for the production of residential and commercial buildings, respectively; 
,H Bi iX X  capital inputs (=capital converted from X-goods by one-to-one) for 
the production of residential and commercial buildings, respectively; iH  
housing units measured in floor area; iB : business buildings measured in 
floor area 
Household N metro population; iN  zone i ’s residents; household ( , )i j : the repre-
sentative household living in zone i  and working in zone j ; ijz  compo-
site consumed by household ( , )i j ; ijq  lot size consumed by household 
( , )i j ; T time endowment; ijd  number of commuting days of household 
( , )i j ; ijV  indirect utility function of the household ( , )i j ; W  welfare 
function = expected maximum utility; ij  idiosyncratic taste term for home-
work zone pairs;   dispersion parameter of the idiosyncratic terms; ,ij iju V  
ordinary and indirect utility functions, respectively; ,
M T
ij ijc c  Lagrangian 
multipliers of income and time, respectively; 
Mc  weighted average of 
M
ijc ’s; 
/T Mij ij ijw c c ; iw  value of time of the travelers in zone i  
Prices ir  unit land rent in zone i ; iw  hourly wage offered in zone i ; 
X
ip  price 
of composite good = price of capital inputs to housing and business building 
producers; 
B
ip  unit rental price of office floor area; 
H
ip  unit rental price of 
housing floor area; iw  value of time of zone i 's travelers; ijw  value of 
time of household ( , )i j  
Externalities i  zone i  households' marginal utility of nonroad infrastructure; 
( , , )Xi i i iS B H K  quality of nonroad infrastructure in zone i  as perceived by 
zone i ’s X-good producers; ( , , )
H
i i i iS B H K  quality of nonroad infrastruc-
ture in zone i as perceived by households living in zone i  
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Taxes ,
B H
i i   property tax rates imposed on one dollar rental price of office build-
ings and housing units, respectively; it , ijt  traffic congestion tolls in zone 
i  and for the trips whose O-D is ( , )i j , respectively; 
ijy  income transfer 
for household (i,j) 
Regulations  is  residential land share of zone i ; ,
H H
i if f  maximum and minimum 
floor area ratios, respectively, imposed on housing units in zone i ; ,
B B
i if f  
maximum and minimum floor area ratio imposed on business buildings in 
zone i , respectively; ,
H H
i i   marginal compliance cost when maximum 
and minimum FARs, respectively, are imposed on housing units in zone i ; 
,B Bi i   marginal compliance cost when maximum and minimum FARs, re-
spectively, are imposed on office buildings in zone i  
